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The High-Level Board of Experts on the Fu-
ture of Global Trade Governance 
The Bertelsmann Stiftung has called into life a 
High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of 
Global Trade Governance. Composed of eminent 
experts and seasoned trade diplomats, it elabo-
rated a number of recommendations to increase 
the effectiveness and salience of the WTO. The 
entirety of these recommendations and underly-
ing analysis of the changing political economy of 
international production and trade can be found in 
the Board’s report “Revitalizing Multilateral Gov-
ernance at the WTO”, authored by Prof Bernard 
Hoekman. This briefing is part of a series of six, 
each of which details one specific recommenda-
tion from the report. 





Fostering deliberation in WTO bodies 
Deadlock in the long-running Doha round of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations, rising use of trade-dis-
torting policies by a number of major WTO Mem-
bers, and the refusal by the United States to ap-
prove new appointments to the WTO Appellate 
Body have eroded the effectiveness of the WTO. 
This has a significant opportunity cost in terms of 
higher barriers to trade and increasing uncertainty 
for firms regarding whether agreed rules of trade 
game can be enforced and relied upon. As im-
portant, a consequence of deadlock in the WTO is 
that the membership has been unable to launch 
efforts to update the current rulebook to make the 
organization fit for purpose for the rapidly growing 
digital economy.  
Some WTO members have called for engage-
ment to consider possible WTO reforms, notably 
the United States, followed in May 2018 by Presi-
dent Macron of France. Whether and what types 
of reforms are necessary is an open question that 
deserves careful deliberation by WTO members. 
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What follows argues that such engagement 
should include a bottom-up process of self-reflec-
tion in the various WTO bodies.  
The WTO is ‘member-driven’. In contrast to other 
international organizations, the WTO Secretariat 
has no executive authority and little autonomy. 
Representatives of the 164 WTO members drive 
the daily work of the organization. These repre-
sentatives do so through numerous WTO bodies, 
including Committees charged with overseeing 
the implementation of specific WTO agreements. 
While day-to-day activities are undertaken by del-
egations based in Geneva, Committees and other 
WTO bodies may also involve officials from capi-
tals. The Secretariat supports the work of all WTO 
bodies with specific inputs prepared at the request 
of the Chairperson or WTO members that partici-
pate in them, preparing minutes of meetings and 
circulating documents submitted by WTO mem-
ber representatives. 
The primary purpose of the various WTO bodies 
is to provide platforms through which the member-
ship monitors the implementation of WTO agree-
ments and can engage with each other on specific 
concerns a member may have. 
Many of the committees operate in two modes – 
one to deal with normal business and one in so-
called special session. The latter are negotiating 
sessions that center (centered) on subjects 
(goals) established by the Doha Development 
Agenda. The Committees are the primary venues 
in which WTO members discuss the operation of 
the agreements they oversee. Working groups 
and working parties are mechanisms to discuss 
specific matters they have been mandated to con-
sider and explore potential modalities for greater 
cooperation in different areas.    
The potential of the normal business functions of 
WTO bodies is not being used to its fullest extent. 
The focus of Committees has been primarily on 
Doha round negotiating issues – which are dead-
locked. There has been too little use of these bod-
ies to reflect on the extent and effects of imple-
mentation of existing agreements and new policy 
issues and tensions that have arisen. Greater dis-
cussion of the international spillover effects of new 
and evolving use of policies is a necessary condi-
tion for identifying where the WTO rulebook may 
need to be updated to promote sustainable eco-
nomic development. Devoting more attention to 
the regular work of the Committees could help to 
revitalize the deliberative function of the WTO.  
Four specific areas are particularly salient for self-
reflection: enhancing the transparency of policies; 
addressing the concerns that many developing 
countries have regarding the implications of WTO 
rules for economic development; what can be 
learned from the implementation of preferential 
trade agreements; and the relevance of WTO ac-
tivities for constituencies in WTO members.   
Do Committees have the information they 
need?  A process of self-reflection at the level of 
WTO bodies could start with revisiting the infor-
mation available to Committees. Transparency is 
essential for reducing uncertainty and is one of the 
main tasks of the WTO. Focusing on its perfor-
mance in generating relevant information at the 
level of Committees and specific WTO agree-
ments is consistent with learning about its perfor-
mance more generally. Better information is not 
simply a public good, although that is an important 
output and a key rationale for the various trans-
parency and surveillance mechanisms included in 
the WTO. Information is primarily beneficial for 
countries themselves – a necessary input for un-
derstanding national policies. A useful role that 
WTO bodies can play is providing a venue for 
members to learn about their own policies as well 
as those of others and to identify where policies 
may be having negative international effects and 
using regular meetings to promote discussion of 
policies that limit adverse trade effects while at-
taining underlying regulatory goals. 
A first step could be for each Committee to ask 
themselves what is needed to become more rele-
vant to the constituencies / stakeholders that have 
a direct interest in the policy areas covered. Is the 
Committee dealing effectively in helping to attain 
national objectives in their area? An important el-
ement of this self-reflection is to determine what 
information is needed to fulfill both the man-
date/objectives established in the relevant WTO 
agreements and the concerns of the government 
officials and agencies in capitals that deal with 
their issue areas. Are these well-understood? Do 
Committee members have the information they 
need?  What information is needed?  
Questions that arise in this connection concern 
the quality and comprehensiveness of the infor-
mation provided to (by) the WTO in terms of al-
lowing analysis of whether it is attaining its objec-
tives (listed in the Preamble); helping economic 
actors navigate the system; or helping citizens to 
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see inside the system. Is WTO data comprehen-
sive? Of high quality? Tracking emerging issues? 
Is information a burden or a benefit? Are members 
willing suppliers of information (statistics, notifica-
tion) in one area but reluctant in another? Why? Is 
this a matter of differences in perceived legitimacy 
of the WTO Secretariat across committees? Does 
it reflect resource constraints? Why are some 
committees more successful in generating rele-
vant information than others? Are there any com-
mon good practices? Could technology be used 
more effectively? And of the information that is be-
ing provided, for instance, though notifications, 
could better use be made if its content? 
Answers to these questions can help to enhance 
transparency and enable better information provi-
sion, including how to ensure timely and satisfac-
tory notifications by members and inform deci-
sions whether the secretariat should be given a 
mandate to collect more information itself, working 
with other international agencies and stakehold-
ers, on matters of relevance to the different WTO 
bodies. Alternatively, it may be that provision of 
assistance would help improve the ability of devel-
oping country members to collect and provide in-
formation. The point is for members to ask them-
selves in each committee if they have the infor-
mation they need to do their job and, if not, what 
can be done to ensure they obtain it.  
This process of self-assessment by Committees 
is not the same as recognizing that Members are 
not living up to notification obligations and calling 
on them to do better in abiding by the many notifi-
cation requirements embodied in the WTO. There 
is a general recognition that WTO notification ob-
ligations are not being fully adhered to by many 
members. Instead of engaging in negative finger-
pointing, we suggest a positive approach – asking 
WTO members in each Committee what specific 
types of information are needed. It may well be 
that many notification requirements in WTO 
agreements are not deemed to be useful. Con-
versely, WTO members may miss information that 
does not have to be notified at present.  
The aim here would be to shift the focus from a 
“business as usual” approach centered on de-
fending long-standing positions to one that fo-
cuses on what each WTO body’s activities should 
be – and based on the answer to this, an assess-
ment of what information is needed to fulfil those 
tasks. This goes beyond the question whether 
members are living up to notification obligations 
embedded in the WTO agreements. It entails re-
viewing these and considering if they should be 
revised or simplified given changes in the organi-
zation of global production. Such self-assessment 
of WTO information provision, on a WTO commit-
tee-by-committee basis, could feed into an annual 
synthesis report (a “Trade Policy Review of the 
System”) that could be discussed in the General 
Council as part a broader review of the functioning 
of the WTO. 
Are rules salient for economic development?  In 
addition to self-reflection on how to enhance the 
effectiveness and relevance of the normal opera-
tion of each committee and other WTO bodies, a 
parallel process of policy dialogue (open, non-
committal deliberation) on whether and how the 
provisions of WTO agreements support sustaina-
ble development goals could be launched. The 
aim would be to identify good policy practices and 
their relationship with each of the subject areas 
covered by the agreements overseen by a com-
mittee. This should include sharing of national ex-
periences and be supported by analysis by the 
Secretariat and other international organizations. 
Such a process could become the basis for incre-
mentally addressing the tensions that surround 
the invocation of special and differential treatment 
(SDT) provisions.   
SDT has become a flash point for disagreement 
between WTO members, with many countries ar-
guing that large emerging economies should not 
invoke SDT provisions. A development-focused 
policy dialogue in the various WTO bodies could 
consider factual questions: What kind of SDT 
could help countries develop world class indus-
tries in sectors where they have comparative ad-
vantages?  What kind of SDT would support better 
insertion in GVCs?  Was SDT a factor in attracting 
foreign investors? Could there be situations where 
SDT actually prevents development? What could 
the WTO and the Secretariat do to assist govern-
ments and economic operators address coordina-
tion problems and other market failures that im-
pede investment?  Are development agencies 
providing aid for trade that addresses such con-
straints?  
A corollary benefit of such substantive delibera-
tion on development dimensions of WTO agree-
ments is that it may help WTO Members to extend 
the approach reflected in the 2013 Agreement on 
Trade Facilitation – the main successful result 
achieved in the Doha Round negotiation – to other 
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policy areas. This centers on agreement on what 
constitutes good policy practice in an area, com-
plemented by credible commitments by higher in-
come members to assist developing countries to 
implement them One element of such a develop-
ment oriented discussion should be to identify the 
scope for greater differentiation among develop-
ing countries. 
Learning from preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs). Another useful focal point for deliberation 
at the Committee level is the operation and imple-
mentation of PTAs in the policy areas covered by 
each Committee. This would complement the fo-
cus of the Committee on Regional Trade Agree-
ments on the legal content (provisions) of the 
PTAs that have been implemented by WTO mem-
bers. This Committee does not discuss the expe-
rience of how PTAs are implemented or assess 
the economic effects of different approaches that 
may be taken in PTAs towards a given policy 
area. Discussion of implementation experience in 
the areas covered by the various WTO bodies is 
best done in the respective bodies as these will 
bring together officials from capitals responsible 
for the specific areas covered by each WTO 
agreement. This has been done in the past on an 
ad hoc basis – making this a regular agenda item, 
with preparation of background documentation by 
the Secretariat would support a more structured 
and regular process aimed at learning from PTA 
experiences.   
PTAs may encompass innovative approaches to 
attenuate the market-segmenting effects of regu-
latory policies that other countries might usefully 
emulate. All WTO Members have a strong interest 
in understanding what innovative PTAs do and 
achieve. Documenting alternative approaches 
used in PTAs would not only improve transpar-
ency but, more important, potentially inform a pro-
cess of learning about what works and what does 
not and identify options that might eventually be 
multilateralized through initiatives under the WTO 
umbrella. 
Connecting better to constituencies. A general 
precondition for the process of self-reflection and 
policy dialogue proposed here to be feasible is 
that it is not blocked by the consensus practice. A 
necessary condition for this is to credibly address 
concerns that issues tabled for discussion may 
give rise to eventual negotiations. Fears that this 
is the ‘end game’ of policy dialogue may induce 
some members to take tactical positions to op-
pose deliberative activities. The rationale for doing 
so is not compelling given that consensus implies 
that countries can always refuse to engage in ne-
gotiations to establish new rules for a policy area. 
If a WTO member insists on blocking open-ended 
discussion, there is nothing that prevents a group 
of WTO members from pursuing this outside the 
WTO. This is very much a second-best outcome 
however, as it is important that the Secretariat can 
support such deliberations and is able to ensure 
there is transparency vis-à-vis WTO members 
that do not participate in them.  
The practice of interpreting consensus as an un-
limited capacity to exercise veto power has been 
a factor impeding the effectiveness of the opera-
tion of the WTO. There is no easy solution to the 
problem given the consensus that exists on con-
sensus. This suggests the focus should be on re-
ducing the scope for WTO members to engage in 
hostage-taking by increasing the costs of such be-
havior, or, equivalently, reducing the return that 
can be achieved. The latter can be done through 
subsets of WTO members pursuing a matter 
through open plurilateral initiatives where these 
are feasible. The former can be pursued by doing 
more to engage with constituencies at the national 
level that have a strong interest or stake in making 
progress in each policy area. 
A common factor underpinning pro-active and 
constructive engagement between WTO mem-
bers in some WTO committees – notably those 
dealing with product regulation – is that they con-
nect a specific constituency, officials responsible 
for achieving regulatory objectives, with trade offi-
cials who are interested in reducing trade costs. 
The joint engagement results in greater ‘owner-
ship’ of the work of these Committees. Necessary 
conditions are that work programs are relevant to 
what officials are responsible for, and that the ac-
tivities of the Committee can be justified to parlia-
ments, businesses and citizens as delivering use-
ful results. Determining if and how the various 
WTO Committees and related bodies connect to 
specific groups in and outside national govern-
ment – and how to do so more effectively – may 
both improve the usefulness of their work and the 
political support by economic operators and na-
tional interest groups for WTO engagement.  
A first step is to identify the constituencies that 
have an interest in the work of a Committee and 
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reflect on how to better engage them. This in-
cludes the relevant regulatory communities at 
both national and international level whose work 
impacts on the policy area covered by a WTO 
agreement. Interacting with these regulatory com-
munities, including regulatory agencies that have 
indirect impacts on trade costs (trade facilitation 
objectives), can assist Committees identify how 
they can help achieve national regulatory objec-
tives more efficiently and effectively. 
Changes in the modus operandi of Committees 
may help increase participation and ‘ownership’ of 
activities. One possibility in this regard is to pro-
vide more support for Chairpersons of Commit-
tees by creating a steering group or bureau of 
three or four WTO member representatives who 
are appointed for several years. In existing prac-
tice, the chairpersons, except for those of Special 
sessions, stay only for one year, which causes 
problems of continuity. The practice of establish-
ing a steering group has been adopted in some of 
the joint initiatives launched at the 2017 Ministerial 
in Buenos Aires. This approach is used in other 
international organizations such as the OECD, 
where each Committee has a ‘bureau’ comprising 
a small group of member country Ambassadors 
who help guide the implementation of work pro-
grams. This helps to ensure continuity, follow-up 
and engagement. An ancillary benefit of broaden-
ing the management of Committees is that it can 
reduce the use of consensus to prevent a majority 
from moving forward in engaging in a specific ac-
tivity. Assuming the steering group or bureau is 
representative and unified on a proposed course 
of action, this raises the reputational costs for a 
member to block initiatives as well as reducing in-
centives to do so. 
Other practical steps can also be considered to 
facilitate policy dialogue of the type advocated 
here.  Adding items to a standing agenda can be 
problematic as it implies taking time from other is-
sues. The processes suggested here will also 
have resource implications raising potential con-
cerns of resource diversion. Such concerns can 
be addressed by holding informal or thematic ses-
sions alongside regular Committee meetings, with 
sponsors of an issue put forward for informal dia-
logue providing additional funding, where needed.  
Finally, and importantly, it is vital that policy dia-
logue in WTO bodies is framed as an open pro-
cess with a view to consider whether there is a 
problem and to learn from experience as op-
posed to starting from the premise that this re-
flects a search for rules. The latter may well be a 
solution, but first it is necessary for there to be a 
common understanding of an issue and whether 
and how rules are needed to address it. The pro-
cess should not be framed as a prelude to nego-
tiations, as this is a key factor why some WTO 
members have opposed policy dialogue on new 
matters in the first place. As noted, such con-
cerns are misplaced as consensus ensures that 
countries can always block the launch of a multi-
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